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In this thesis, I meld theories of emotional expressiveness with concepts of Brecht’s dialectical 
theatre to examine the potentiality of fomenting prosocial change in spectators. I ask how Brecht’s 
theatre can become a more efficacious prosocial tool in cultures and communities. On Brecht’s 
stage, theatrical elements coalesce and collide with an emphasis on the social conditions of 
contradiction. This dissonance is embodied for both actor and spectator to actively critique during 
performance and promote synthesizing social transformation. For instance, Brecht’s concepts of 
Gestus and Haltung manifest both as the representation of role in society and the social 
contradiction of external human relations. Within Gestus and Haltung, emotion and affect via the 
face and body can be analyzed as a shaping force of social behavior that requires scrutiny from the 
actors on stage and the spectators being affected by these motivating expressions. I root this project 
in Brecht’s 1938 anti-fascist play, Fear and Misery of the Third Reich. The 25 playlets of Fear 
and Misery offer a cross-section investigation of daily German life under Nazi power and display 
how the violence and fear of fascism produces a miserable society. Psychophysiological 
constructions of fear are ubiquitous in Fear and Misery. Previous research posits more accurate 
recognition and interpretation of fear portrayals predicts prosocial behavior in others. In Brecht’s 
dialectical theatre, emotion and affect, along with other theatrical devices, must be considered and 
commented on by spectators to create a dialogue. Perhaps, most importantly, this performative 
discourse must realize that social conditions can and must change. Thus, I argue that the 
AFFECT FOR EFFECT: EMOTION AND PROSOCIAL CHANGE IN 
BRECHT’S THEATRE 
 
Alex Knapp, BPhil 
 
University of Pittsburgh, 2018
 
 v 
combination of expressions of fear and the anti-fascist material of Fear and Misery may tune a 
spectator to a motivated prosociality against fascism in self and society. 
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QUOTE 
 
 
 
 
The persecutors can only be got rid of once enough people understand the causes of their 
dangers and miseries, and the way things really happen, and how to get rid of the persecutors. 
So it’s a question of communicating this understanding to as large a number as possible. It isn’t 
easy, however one chooses to go about it. 
 Today I would like to discuss with you theatre people what you might be able to do. 
- Bertolt Brecht, The Messingkauf Dialogues 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 
 
On May 21st, 1938, a small group of proletarian actors debuted Fear and Misery of the 
Third Reich in Paris. In response to growing tension in Europe and the horrors of Nazi rule reported 
from confidents in his home country, the self-exiled Bertolt Brecht composed a play to criticize 
the tumultuous dissemination of fascism. However, Adolf Hitler, Joseph Goebbels, Hermann 
Göring, or Heinrich Himmler, were not to take center stage in this narrative. Rather, Fear and 
Misery endeavors to dissect and expose a cross-section of daily German life and everyday social 
relations driven and distorted by fear and misery. Nazis are portrayed as tramps; farcical beings 
that were just as likely to trip on their own shoelaces as to commit sadistic behavior. This violence 
predicates, though, on one unifying paste that bonds oppressor and oppressed: fear. Fear-laden 
social events are ubiquitous in Fear and Misery, but their presence does not just attempt to instill 
horror in a spectator to accomplish a political effect. By complicating the representation of 
emotional fear on the stage, terror maintains a reciprocally motivating influence on audiences. This 
force contrasts with dimensions of humor and prosocial behavior in response to the unsettling 
prospects, and laughable worldview, of the feebly composed base of fascist ideology. To begin, I 
will discuss my guiding questions, then I examine the critical gap that makes this study important 
and, finally, I consider my current methodology and outline the coming sections. 
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The present study seeks to meld Bertolt Brecht’s theatrical concepts of Gestus and Haltung 
with psycho-neuroscientific theories of emotional communication and expressiveness. I ask, how 
can emotion and affect help Brecht’s theatre become a more efficacious and fomenting prosocial 
tool in cultures and communities? Prosocial behavior, or the socially-minded drive to aid another 
or society-as-a-whole, corresponds intuitively with Brecht’s political theatre. Drawing from 
cognitive and affectual science, I contend that the depiction of emotional articulacy, especially 
fear, in the face and body via Gestus and Haltung can promote prosocial behavior in a spectator 
when joined with theatre for political change. As a result, my intervention combats narratives of 
the “emotion-less Brecht” and supports a placement of the emotions in Brecht’s theatre as a 
dialectical conveyance of social behavior for spectator critique and instigation. In other words, 
affect for effect. 
Presently, I use Gestus and Haltung to express theories of a socially representative 
performance that resides in the external relations of peoples. Gestus and Haltung thus regard the 
matter of stances taken by a figure on the stage towards another or a circumstance. Haltung bares 
the present social relations and enables spectators to witness how social forces can carve the 
behavior of figures in specific situations. Take for instance how an unexpected death, a discrete 
power play, or a familial revelation shifts a person’s behavior towards others, themselves, and the 
event they reside in. It is in this pliability of human nature towards certain events that reveal a 
variation in Haltung. Gestus, on the other hand, is the entire bearing or stance considered by actor, 
figure, language, design, and music. For example, the position a figure maintains towards these 
unforeseen deaths, power struggles, and family troubles detail the gestic representation of their 
total role in society and overall stance taken towards social matters. 
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As Gestus and Haltung manifest, in part, as an embodied act, these concepts fit well with 
theories of emotions and affects. To put it broadly, emotion is: “any strong mental or instinctive 
feeling, as pleasure, grief, hope, fear, etc., deriving esp. from one's circumstances, mood, or 
relationship with others.”1 The “feeling state” that constitutes emotion thus produces affect, which 
classifies in two apt ways: 1.) “A feeling or subjective experience accompanying a thought or 
action or occurring in response to a stimulus; an emotion, a mood,” or, 2.) “the outward display of 
emotion or mood, as manifested by facial expression, posture, gestures, tone of voice, etc.”2 I place 
Gestus and Haltung in conversation with the latter definition, in that, affect or affectual expression 
is the physiological production of the emotion felt.   
This study leans and builds upon significant undertakings by scholars of Brecht’s 
aesthetics, the cognitive turn in theatre studies, and the psychology of emotional expression.3 My 
intervention concentrates on the construction, recognition, and portrayal of the communication of 
the emotions, namely fear, in Brecht’s theatre. Despite the cognitive turn in theatre studies, there 
has not yet been an explicit union of Gestus and Haltung with psycho-neuroscientific theories of 
affectual expression. While scholars are placing Brecht’s positions on emotion and affect under 
reconsideration, these methods create a discourse that centers more on the theory behind affect in 
the vein of comparative literature or philosophy, rather than social scientific research.4 This gap 
has been filled, in a way, by the beginnings of a cognitive look at Brecht’s theatre, like Bruce 
McConachie’s 2006 essay “A Cognitive Approach to Brechtian Theatre.” McConachie offers an 
                                                 
1 “emotion, n.3.” OED Online. January 2018. Oxford University Press. 
http://www.oed.com/viewdictionaryentry/Entry/11125. 
2 Ibid, “affect, n. 5b.” 
3 For instance, I engage with the work of Bruce McConachie, Rhonda Blair, Paul Ekman, Brian Parkinson, David 
Barnett, Abagail Marsh, Megan Kozak, and Nalini Ambady. I delineate my dialogue with these scholars below.  
4 See: Vidar Thorsteinsson, “‘This Great Passion for Producing’: The Affective Reversal of Brecht's Dramatic 
Theory.” Cultural Critique 97, no. 97 (2017): 57-83. 
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analysis of Brecht’s concept of estrangement, Verfremdungseffekt, emotion, and empathy in 
relation to cognitive theorists.5 My project expands on his foundation to highlight the social 
communication of the emotions and how these processes may bolster Brecht’s theorem of Gestus 
and Haltung.  
Similarly, David Barnett’s Brecht in Practice – Theatre, Theory, and Performance supplies 
an accessible reading of Brechtian theorem and its translation to the stage. It would seem Barnett’s 
book expresses a desire to abate the misapplications and misunderstanding Brecht’s theories, as 
“it is in the theatre itself where the most significant problems lie.”6 As a result, his distillation of 
the concepts of Gestus, Haltung, and emotion in actor provide necessary definitions that make this 
work possible. 
Regarding the realm of psychology, I draw from the research of Paul Ekman, Silvan 
Tomkins, and Brian Parkinson, among others. Most notably, Paul Ekman’s foundational studies 
on the Fore Tribe in Papa New Guinea established the modern universal theory of emotional 
expressions. Ekman classifies the six “core” emotions as fear, anger, surprise, disgust, happiness, 
and sadness, and, as of now, the universal theory upholds with hardy empirical evidence. Though, 
as I show in the proceeding sections, the universality of the emotions has its own culturally 
representative caveats that calls forth a strong need for analysis in theatrical medium. I use these 
theories and other discrete empirical studies to elucidate the communicative and inciting prosocial 
possibilities of emotional assessment in Brecht’s aesthetics of social transformation. 
As I show, contradiction is a key part of Brecht’s dialectical theatre, most noticeably in the 
examination that results from a spectator commenting on witnessed relationships. I define 
                                                 
5 Bruce A. McConachie, “A Cognitive Approach to Brechtian Theatre,” Theatre Symposium: A Journal of the 
Southeastern Theatre Conference 14, (2006): 9-24. 
6 David Barnett, Brecht in Practice: Theatre, Theory and Performance (Bloomsbury Publishing, 2015), 2. 
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contradiction most closely as the taught state of being between two or more opposing forces. In 
Brecht’s theatre, we are to observe social behavior that oft unveils contradictions in various 
elements, be it concerning the relationship and stances of actor and figure, language and figure, 
figure and spectator, spectator and set, and so on. For example, in Fear and Misery a contrast 
between language and figure occurs when a worker shouts “Heil Hitler!” to shirk Nazi suspicion 
of his communist leanings. The worker fulfills a sociopolitical obligation but opposes actual 
devotion for the Führer with fearful deference. Contradiction then relates most appositely to 
dialectics. To advance this discussion, I must first delineate what I mean by “dialectical” and how 
figure severely differs from the depiction of character on Brecht’s stage. 
Dialectics, or the dialectical, defines as the “critical investigation of truth through reasoned 
argument, often spec. by means of dialogue or discussion.”7 In other words, understanding via 
critique. However, given the influence that Hegel’s dialectics had on Marxism which in turn 
captivated Brecht, it is possible to view his perception of dialectics as Marxist.8 Due to this, new 
ways of thinking and inferring are born out of a contradiction between the thesis and the antithesis 
that results in a synthesis thereby creating a new thesis. Dialectics in Brecht’s aesthetics endure to 
challenge that which society propagates as stable, thus the theatre as a site for the depiction of this 
contradiction was attractive to Brecht. The “epic” theatre, a term he would later consider as 
“dialectical,” seeks to utilize this model.9 For instance, a Brechtian performance may have two 
sites of contradiction (thesis and antithesis) that synthesize into an incitement of social action. In 
                                                 
7 Oxford English Dictionary, “dialectic, n.1a.” 
8 The Hegelian dialectic entails three distinct facets: the thesis, the antithesis, and the synthesis. 
9 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic (1st ed. New York: Hill and 
Wang, 1964), 277. Brecht clarifies in the Appendices to the Short Organum, “The theatre of the scientific age is in a 
position to make dialectics into a source of enjoyment. The unexpectedness of logically progressive or zigzag 
development, the instability of every circumstance, the joke of contradiction and so forth: all these are ways of 
enjoying the liveliness of men, things and processes, and they heighten in both our capacity for life and our pleasure 
in it. Every art contributes to the greatest art of all, the art of living.” 
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a broad sense, Fear and Misery illustrates the opposing friction of fascism (thesis) and resistance 
or dispiritedness from oppression (antithesis). The synthesis, then, expects to occur from audience 
critique and their desire to shift the social relations rather than propagandistic content that does not 
concern political effect. The observance of conflicting social behaviors reaches out to spectators 
and calls for change via critique, contemplation, and the formation of a specific stance, not through 
the promulgation of a beleaguered political message.     
To avoid falling prey to fresh misconceptions of Brecht’s aesthetics, I must also explain 
what is meant by a theatre for political effect. Manfred Wekwerth, a previous director of the 
Berliner Ensemble, offers two salient observations related to any misapplications. He asserts, 
“these plays aren’t just political because they have a political subject or because political songs are 
sung in them, but rather because they adopt a certain political stance (‘Haltung’) and want to spread 
the message: that social circumstances need to be changed.”10 Furthermore, Wekwerth advocates 
that the “unpolitical” may become political, in that, plays that do not prescribe to definite political 
effects and aesthetics can in themselves sustain political implications.11 From the Fabel, or “story,” 
of a performance to the figures themselves, dialectics are an integral facet of all Brechtian theorem. 
As a result, it is in the contradictions of figure where one may begin to construct Gestus and 
Haltung.      
Furthermore, differences between the use of “figure” and “character” requires sizable 
consideration. In Brecht’s mind, character fixes an actor and constitutes inflexible characteristics. 
Characteristics of character are predictable and sustain relatively unmovable trajectories of 
behavior (think archetypes: the hero, the villain, the nerd, the cool guy, the “hot” girl, etc.). Some 
                                                 
10 Manfred Wekwerth and Anthony Hozier, Daring to Play: A Brecht Companion (New York: Abingdon; Oxon: 
Routledge, 2011), 23. 
11 Ibid, 21. 
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characteristics may lead a character and actor to behave in a permanent manner without displaying 
the social malleability of human nature. If theatre is to embody and portray why humans behave 
in the ways we do, the concept of set character equip with lasting characteristics does not 
accomplish this goal. Figure, on the other hand, concentrates on how qualities of figure can be 
contradictory and dwell in external relations and circumstances. Simply put, Brecht saw the use of 
“figure” as a more plastic concept for both performance and actor.12 A figure is open to change 
and free from tropes that materialize a compact resolution of self. The figure revolves around 
contradiction. If a figure can change, society may affect it. Therefore, spectators can witness these 
contradictions and attempt to understand why figures may behave as they do in a variety of 
settings. Specifically, when they perform an act or affect other figures in a manner that disagrees 
with previously presented behavior. In turn, the audience can witness and critique these 
contradictions within their own selves, relationships, and/or society and may wish to placate the 
dissonance by enacting social change. 
To coagulate contradiction in figure, Brecht offers the “not-but” trick. The idea behind 
telling an actor to ponder the “not-but” of their figure is to mark that situations can oft happen 
differently when varying social forces inflict transformations. For instance, Oedipus does not 
accept that he has fulfilled the prophecy but blinds himself. In Fear and Misery, “The Jewish Wife” 
does not stay with her gentile husband in Germany but leaves to preserve his career and reputation. 
Use of “not-but” requires the actor to understand that their figure can always react inversely to a 
myriad of social events and contexts. Thus, these circumstances comprise the “story” or Fabel. 
The Fabel is not plot but an “interpreted version of events” and thus “an account of the play’s 
                                                 
12 Barnett, Brecht in Practice, 84. 
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action from a dialectical view because it teases out contradictions.”13 Fabel is contrasting and 
interpretative to construct socially representative events. The Fabel then becomes transparent via 
an Arrangement, the condensation of contradiction in a scene for spectator engagement and 
analysis.14 These elements of Brecht’s theatre are important and must be kept in play, despite my 
attention towards Gestus and Haltung.  
My critical lens thus engages with cognitive and affectual science to support the application 
of Brecht’s aesthetics for subsequent political and prosocial effect. I find Brecht’s theatre vital to 
employ due to its foremost prominence on the cause and effect of behavior in the external social 
relations of human beings. In Fear and Misery, violence and fear pair to produce ubiquitous 
misery. Thus, the anti-fascist stance of the work renders social relationships to allow spectators to 
scrutinize the interplaying cause and effect of daily life in Nazi Germany. As I show, the 
observation of behavior in others, specifically regarding emotional communication, is a significant 
facet of human motivation. I emphasize fear as its representation and recognition has curious 
effects on the prosociality of others. Prosocial behavior then maintains a major influence on the 
political impact of Fear and Misery of the Third Reich.  
Moreover, Brecht’s view of fear greatly buttresses my coming assertions. As Astrid 
Oesmann outlines, Brecht asserts that “fear results from visual perception” and “that our fear 
mirrors the fear observed in others.”15 Thus, this position provides the connective tissue between 
the theatrical realm of observation and fear in self resulting from terror interpreted in society. In 
the manner of an inherently social scientific approach, Brecht finds the motivation of fear to lie in 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 86. 
14 Ibid., 90. 
15 Astrid Oesmann, Staging History: Brecht's Social Concepts of Ideology (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 2005), 192. 
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its affectual expression and communication with others. Due to the leading role of observation in 
these processes, Fear and Misery becomes an ideal medium for this theatrical enaction. In addition, 
Fear and Misery has a political past that is no less important than the sociopolitical implications 
the play upholds. Scholars, like John and Ann White, hail it as one of Brecht’s most well-composed 
works, especially in the vein of anti-fascist rhetoric.16 Though as Stephen Parker reminds, “the 
difficult production history of a variable text has hampered that recognition, and other plays have 
eclipsed it.”17 Despite this lack of acknowledgement, I find Fear and Misery to be an excellent 
object of study for this analysis.  
As such, Fear and Misery becomes an exemplar of Gestus and Haltung in practice as well 
as the embodiment of the emotional state and affectual expression of fear. The recognition of facial 
fear has been shown to predict prosocial behavior in others.18 This priming of prosociality, when 
coupled with Brecht’s dialectical theatre, combines critical contradiction in theatrical elements 
with spectator critique to, hopefully, incite societal change. In this way, I posit that the displays of 
facial and bodily fear made prominent through the Gestus and Haltung of figures and their relations 
prepares subsequent prosocial behavior in spectators. Given the political effect considered in Fear 
and Misery, this prosociality in spectator tunes to the anti-fascist Fabel present, congealing in a 
motivated prosocial stance against fascism. 
Lastly, the current study constitutes two parts. Part One centers on Brecht’s theories of 
Haltung and Gestus. I begin with an investigation of the historical contexts that establish Fear and 
                                                 
16 John J. White and Ann White. Bertolt Brecht's Furcht Und Elend Des Dritten Reiches: A German Exile Drama in 
the Struggle Against Fascism (Rochester, N.Y: Camden House, 2010), 8. Brecht, too, appears to place Fear and 
Misery as a solid example of an anti-fascist play. 
17 Stephen Parker, Bertolt Brecht: A Literary Life (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 374.  
18 See: Abigail A. Marsh, Megan N. Kozak, and Nalini Ambady. “Accurate identification of fear facial expressions 
predicts prosocial behavior.” Emotion 7, no. 2 (2007): 1-25. See also: Abigail A. Marsh, and Nalini Ambady. “The 
influence of the fear facial expression on prosocial responding.” Cognition and Emotion 21, no. 2 (2007): 225-247. 
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Misery of the Third Reich as a model for Brecht’s aesthetics in practice. Then, I unpack Gestus 
and Haltung to join these concepts with Fear and Misery. Following the examination of Gestus 
and Haltung, I divulge the ways in which these theorems can pair with affect theories of affectual 
expression and the social communication of the emotions.  
In Part Two, I explore the psychophysiological science of the articulation of emotion and, 
most intently, the potentiality for a conveyance of the expression of fear as a primer for prosocial 
behavior in spectators of Brecht’s political theatre. By placing these ideas in conversation, I 
uncover a relationship between the numerous portrayals of fear in Fear and Misery that formulate 
the Gestus and Haltung of figures. Regarding the recognition of emotion, I reveal the possibility 
of utilizing fear to impel prosociality in spectators. When merged with the specific political effect 
of the anti-fascist Fear and Misery, the translation of fear in Gestus and Haltung becomes the 
precedent for a prosocial action in the audience, all reliant on witnessing social conditions that 
require change. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of avenues for future study.  
 11 
2.0  PART ONE 
Haltung and Gestus: The Dialectics of Emotion 
Mediocre actors cannot communicate terror, only innocuousness. 
Bertolt Brecht, Letters, 193819 
 
 
 
 
Brecht’s theatre upholds important methods for portraying the emotions dialectically for 
political effect and prosocial motivation. As a spectator observes the suspenseful circumstance of 
“walking on eggshells” around an SS officer, viscerally responds to the flogging of a fear-filled 
person, or witnesses change in behavior due to terror-laden blackmail, displays of emotion detail 
evocative information. For Brecht, viewing these vignettes stimulates criticism and oft provokes 
one salient conclusion: this horror is unnecessary, and the social conditions can and must change. 
Due to this, actors should construct their figures in such a way that emotional communication is 
not only clear and meaningful but also complicated dialectically. The means to enact this emotional 
complication are Brecht’s theories of Gestus and Haltung. The external residence of Gestus and 
Haltung explicitly elicits the verbal and non-verbal social communication of emotion to an 
audience for prosocial fomentation. Gestus marks the whole bearing of a figure in a situation and 
an entire performance. Similarly, Haltung (pl. Haltungen), is the stance taken by figures to 
particular events that make both relationships lucid to spectators and show how social dynamics 
can mold behavior. 
                                                 
19 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Letters (New York: Routledge, 1990), 285.  
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In the anti-fascist montage of playlets Fear and Misery of the Third Reich, dialectics, 
Gestus, and Haltung are key. When figures of power, such as the Nazis, portray the facial 
expression of fear via a shift in their Haltung, it contrasts the Gestus of associations with others 
on stage, their uniform, authoritative vocal modulation, and positionality of the body emphasizing 
social role. Thus, the dialectical bearing of fear in the milieu of fascist dictatorship undermines 
power schemas with sociopolitical connotations. In displays of emotions that contrast within and 
between figures, the spectator may question why figures behave in certain ways that result from 
said emotion(s) in the external social relations. This critical questioning from the spectator will 
then accentuate an emotion like fear that impels the main theme of Fear and Misery, as 
contradictory. Hence, a variation in Gestus or Haltung overtly motions for one to ponder how 
much power these figures truly hold when they are just as fearful as those they oppress.  
The coming section seeks to understand how theories of emotional expressiveness enmesh 
with Brecht’s notions of Gestus and Haltung. I first delineate a history of Fear and Misery of the 
Third Reich to contextualize its present elements of Gestus and Haltung. I then detail Haltung and, 
following, Gestus to cement conceptualizations of these theories in Brechtian performance. In Part 
Two, I explore affect theories to parse the role of the emotions in verbal and non-verbal social 
communication via the face and body with my connections to Gestus and Haltung.  
2.1 FEAR AND MISERY OF THE THIRD REICH IN CONTEXT 
Brecht, self-exiled from his native Germany under the Nazi Regime, began composing a 
“series of (horror) scenes” in 1937 which he believed would lend itself greatly for production in 
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the United States.20 Though, the catalyzers of what would eventually manifest Fear and Misery is 
seen in his poems of the mid-1930s and a continued relationship with Margarette Steffin.21 Steffin, 
both confidant and a previous lover of Brecht, provided essential concrete eyewitness reports and 
combined documentary evidence of life under Nazi rule, influencing the development of these 
poems and plays.22 Come 1938, Brecht began sending many of the playlets to Erwin Piscator, an 
influencer and collaborator to Brecht. As Piscator decided not to work on a production, Brecht 
contacted Slatan Dudow, a filmmaker and communist who would become the director of the first 
production of Fear and Misery, and Karl Korsch, the prominent Marxist philosopher who spent 
time with the exiled Brecht in Denmark.23 These correspondences expose the insistency of 
Brecht’s belief in Fear and Misery as a significant undercutting stance against fascism and a piece 
of resistance. The roots of such opposition lie in the depictions of the everyday of the Third Reich 
encompassing the paper-thin façade of a powerful might that relies shakily on violence and fear. 
In a 1938 letter to Piscator, Brecht states: 
Everybody is wondering how long a war Hitler could fight. And the so-called democracies 
are very much interested in knowing how the Nazi dictatorship affects the various social 
groupings. The play gives a cross section of all German society in nineteen scenes (a few 
more could be added). Terror and resistance everywhere.24  
 
This note indicates Brecht’s intention for Fear and Misery as a depiction of everyday life 
under fascist ruling, and one that can also inform or educate other societies. Similarly, in a letter 
to Korsch, Brecht discusses the possibility of a production of Fear and Misery in Paris and his 
want to produce the play in the United States as “fear has now gripped Europe.”25 Albeit, one of 
                                                 
20 Brecht and Willett, Letters, 280-281. 
21 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Poems & Songs from the Plays (London: Methuen, 1990), 119-160. 
22 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Fear and Misery of the Third Reich (London: Bloomsbury Methuen Drama, 
2009), xlii. 
23 Brecht and Willett, Letters, 281. Brecht considers Korsch to be one of his Marxist teachers. 
24 Ibid., 280. 
25 Ibid., 281. 
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the most conspicuous instances of Brecht’s plan to produce Fear and Misery arises in letters to 
Dudow, who was concerned the play may prompt a message that was too depressing. To rebut, 
Brecht marks multiple points of resistance throughout the play, how necessary the displaying of 
“the struggle” is, why the casting of capable actors is pertinent, and his assertions that the piece is 
not dismal.26 In this heated exchange with Dudow, Brecht affirms what I contend is the thesis of 
Fear and Misery: 
Because it shows too clearly what a fragile foundation fear and misery are for a Reich, how 
few supporters the Nazis can really count on, how ineffectual terror is bound to be, in fact, 
how inevitably, it must create resistance, even in sections of the population that originally 
welcomed it with cheers.27 
 
Given this thesis, considering Fear and Misery a piece of resistance can appear justifiable as it is 
a direct stance against fascism. Though, the representations of resistance that are apparent only 
support a robust critique of the Third Reich; any possible pieces of progressive, working-class 
rhetoric are secondary to this scrutiny as Brecht assures: “After all, we’re not showing the working-
class movement and its resistance, we’re criticizing the Nazi system, and everything depends on 
the incisiveness of our criticism.”28 Hence, the exact method of “resistance” in Fear and Misery 
has come under some debate.  
As is true with Brecht’s dialectical theatre, representations of resistance are complex, but 
Fear and Misery does not portray an “active” conception of resistance. Rather, the play accentuates 
“figures who either fail to resist altogether, or whose resistance is limited.”29 So, Fear and Misery 
                                                 
26 Ibid., 281-282. The series of letters with Dudow contain Brecht’s frustration with the actors at the disposal of 
Dudow and the selection of scenes for Fear and Misery, with Brecht going as far to state, “I see that I’m sounding 
rather emotional. That’s because I’m upset.” His concern regarding the actors is most notable in his questioning of 
their talent, worrying that their own mediocrity would lead to “political feebleness.” As this play was a critique of 
the Third Reich, whose power was far greater than the provocative attempts of a few theatre practitioners, it must 
withhold the “hallmark of durability.” 
27 Ibid., 282. 
28 Ibid., 284. 
29 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, xlvi.  
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may represent a method of resistance, given the fervent “NO!” that ends the play and indicates a 
position against the coming war combined with moments of solidarity amongst figures. 
Nonetheless, the play fluctuates about an outlook of opposition that more often displays its 
negation than its success.30 John Willett clarifies this position by stating, “So while Brecht’s 
portrayal of resistance may be class oriented, his representation of the suffering caused by Nazi 
dictatorship pays no heed to class divisions.”31 The conceptions of resistance weaved in Fear and 
Misery then coalesce as a matter of the external social relations, with contradictions of figure 
abounding to jut forth perceptions of political like-mindedness against fascism, how unity is 
squelched by hegemony, and those who have fallen prey to the furor of authoritarian belief 
systems. Perhaps, Brecht’s most intriguing mode of “resistance” is in the building of figures in 
Fear and Misery. No matter class or power status, no one figure is a victim and all misery of 
dictatorship is as resistible as the fear that stifles opposition. In my analysis of Haltung and Gestus 
via Fear and Misery and affect theories, the ways in which fear greatly determines Brecht’s 
critiques of fascism and attempts of resistance will become clearer.  
In Paris in May of 1938, Slatan Dudow directed the first production of Fear and Misery, 
at the time bearing the title 99%. Scenes from the Third Reich.32 This production performed eight 
                                                 
30 Brecht and Willett, Letters, 285. The “NO!” in scene 24, “Consulting the People,” of Fear and Misery is a clear 
stance against the coming of Hitler’s war as he begins occupation of Austria. The figures of this scene, wishing to 
act, attempt to write a manifesto against the war, which the female worker asserts should simply state “NO!” 
However, the conception of the “NO!” at the end shifted at times during Brecht’s correspondence with Dudow, and 
subsequent productions of Fear and Misery have chosen or may select playlets that do not end with scene 24. As a 
result, before the first production, Brecht challenged Dudow on the ordering of the playlets saying that other scenes 
“would give us our No at the end.” 
31 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, xlviii. 
32 Parker, A Literary Life, 375. The title of 99% is of note not only due to its topical reference to the Austrian 
Anschluss Referendum of 1938, but also Brecht’s doubt, “99% (Important objection: it won’t fit into the metre of 
the ballad) strikes me as a littler too clever, but it’s all right with me if our friends want it. Only it’s rather weak and 
suggests a different sort of play.” Another title considered by Brecht was The German-March Past (Earlier variant: 
The German Troops March Past) in direct reference to the poem and prologue in Fear and Misery of the same 
name.     
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of the twenty-five playlets Brecht had written at the time.33 In translating criticism of this first 
production from the Brecht Handbuch, John Willett finds positive comments on the structure of 
Fear and Misery from German critic and theorist Walter Benjamin. However, Benjamin spouts 
that one actor’s empathetic portrayal of an SA man was “politically inappropriate, and so he 
implied that the epic mode of acting is an absolute necessity in this kind of role,” according to 
Willett’s translation.34 These concerns are reasonable and his call for the epic theatre’s disruption 
of empathetic processes understandable, especially given the sociopolitical moment he was in. For 
Benjamin, it would seem attempts to abate empathetic processes are essential in the performative 
discussion of the Third Reich. Especially, when considering acting that deters or complicates any 
potential empathizing with a Nazi, in figure or otherwise. 
Apart from the inferences of resistance in the text, the first production of Fear and Misery 
was itself a provocative stance, as it was performed by a “refugee group” of proletarian artists that 
could not even pay Brecht royalties.35 In the latter half of an August 15th, 1938 journal entry, 
Brecht appears to express an admiration for the attempts of this proletarian theatre: 
the montage, a process that has been so thoroughly condemned, arose here out of letters 
from dudow who needed something for his little proletarian theatre-group in paris. so the 
proletarian theatre in exile is keeping the theatre alive. while in Moscow maxim vallentin, 
the one-time director of a berlin agitprop group, has gone over to the bourgeois theatre and 
                                                 
33 Now twenty-four scenes, canonically. 
34 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, lviii. Relating to Haltung and Gestus, this notion is of prominence and will 
garner further consideration in their respective sections and the coming chapter.   
35 Brecht and Willett, Letters, 291. Brecht notes this in a letter to the American Guild for German Cultural Freedom 
thanking them for extending his grant. This September 1938 letter also provides another succinct thesis of Fear and 
Misery, stating, “This summer I was engaged in completing my Fear and Misery of the Third Reich cycle, an 
attempt in twenty-seven scenes to show the reaction of almost every section of the German people to the National 
Socialist dictatorship. I tried to bring out two points which I thought it vital to make known abroad: first the 
enslavement, disenfranchisement, and paralysis of all sections of the population under the National Socialist 
dictatorship (people living in the democracies have far too little concrete knowledge of this); second, the state of 
mind prevailing in the army of the totalitarian state, which is a cross section of the population as a whole (to give 
people outside Germany an idea of the fragility of this war machine).” Original emphasis.     
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announced that in art an appeal has to be made to the emotions, which can only mean reason 
has to be switched off.36  
 
Here, Brecht supposes the proletarian theatre is surviving and supporting the theatre in a time of 
disarray. The jab at Maxim Vallentin, who had now shifted from agitprop performance to a 
Stanislavskian method, is curious as it ostensibly links an appeal to audience’s emotions (as 
opposed to reason) with Brecht’s negative view of bourgeois theatre. This is also evident when 
Brecht comments in the Appendices to a Short Organum, “The bourgeois theatre’s performances 
always aim at smoothing over contradictions, at creating false harmony, at idealization.”37 Brecht, 
combatting this institution, finds a proletarian theatre without emotion to circumvent reasoning 
thus disabling achievement of the critical thought to conceive the social reality in an effective 
manner. I consider Brecht’s viewpoints and misconceptions of the emotions in my coming 
discussion of affect theories. However, I feel it necessary to emphasize the present radicalism of 
his emotional negation. Although polemical and differing in later theoretical writings, this 
disavowal was a method of undermining a bourgeois reinforcement of ideals that never culminates 
to actual change. In other words, theatre that produces and propagates an inactive and complicit 
nature resulting from an ingrained norm and manufactured emotion that is perhaps destined, fixed, 
and/or devoid of social meaning. I seek a divergent consideration of emotion in Brechtian 
performance; this study draws from the affectual science of our current scientific age which, in 
                                                 
36 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Bertolt brecht journals (New York: Routledge, 1993), 15. Note: I have 
reproduced this entry as it is presented in the English translation, including Brecht’s penchant for lacking 
capitalization. The “montage” refers to the montage style of scenes present in Fear and Misery. Brecht’s ending 
comment on the “appeal to the emotions” represents his early contention that pure application of emotion 
undermines reasoning and thus prohibits critique for social change.     
37 Bertolt Brecht and John Willett, Brecht on Theatre: The Development of an Aesthetic (London: Methuen, 1964), 
277. Correspondingly, bourgeois theatre can be defined as performance “produced for maximum profits, its themes 
and values addressed to ‘(petit-bourgeois)’ audience who spend large amounts of money to consume an ideology 
and aesthetic already familiar to them.” See: Patrice Pavis, Dictionary of the Theatre: Terms, Concepts, and Analysis 
(Buffalo [N.Y.];Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1998), 37. 
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turn, supports the motivations that the emotions trigger in an individual and, most importantly, 
external sociality. 
World War II prohibited any other European productions of Fear and Misery until it ended. 
After the war, two productions were produced in Basal, Switzerland in 1946 and 1947. Germany 
saw its first performance of Fear and Misery on January 30th, 1948 in the Deutsches Theater, West 
Germany, and a second in 1949 in Dortmund, West Germany, consisting of a “low podium 
positioned on the black stage. At the side of the podium, two rows of plywood figures formed a 
mute choir of SA men.”38 From 1957 to 1963, the Berliner Ensemble put on 156 performances 
and other post-WW2 productions occurred throughout Europe.39 The English premiere of Fear 
and Misery was in 1962 as a student production at the Guildhall School.40 Other productions in 
the United Kingdom appeared in Leeds in 1979, at the Bristol Old Vic Theatre in 1972, and the 
Edinburgh Fringe festival in 1998, to name a few. More recently, Fear and Misery has seen two 
London productions at the Union Theatre in 2016 and the Brockley Jack Studio Theatre in 2018. 
Fear and Misery also inspired adaptations that draw from the political nuances of the text and 
marked anti-fascist stance.41 Thus, the pursuing value of Fear and Misery is not that it speaks to 
any specific sociopolitical moment, despite the content being a take on interpreted conditions of 
the Third Reich. Instead, Fear and Misery plays to social circumstances and relations that have 
been corrupted by particular beliefs and, subsequently, must alter. Figures of fascism can die; 
ideologies can endure. 
                                                 
38 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, lxiii. 
39 Ibid., lxiv-lxv.  
40 S, L. G. 1962, “Fear and Misery in the Third Reich,” The Stage and Television Today (Archive: 1959-1994) 
(4232): 18. 
41 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, lxiv-lxv. Additonally, adaptations have used Fear and Misery as anti-
communist performance.   
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As I noted above, Brecht had America on his mind for some time whilst in exile in 
Denmark. He emigrated to the U.S. in 1941 and saw to multiple productions of Fear and Misery. 
Also, the first English translation of Fear and Misery, composed by Eric Bentley with the aid of 
Elizabeth Hauptmann, came to press in 1941 as well as a full German variant in 1945.42  Perhaps 
the most important and fascinating of these productions was in New York in June 1945. Fear and 
Misery (titled The Private Life of the Master Race) was to be directed by Erwin Piscator, who 
planned many epic elements to be imbued within the piece. These instances included: The on-stage 
pianist held at gunpoint by a member of the SS and required to change “The Star-Spangled Banner” 
to the Horst-Wessel song, live critique of democracy and dictatorship, and visible stagehands and 
actors to perpetually tell the audience they are indeed witnessing theatre, not reality.43 Despite 
these provocative ideas, Piscator quit just before opening night and a new director was hired.44  
The initial productions of Fear and Misery in Europe and the United States provide vital 
information regarding its performance as well as the necessary implementation of Gestus, Haltung, 
Verfremdung, and the “epic” theatre in context. One such incidence relates to Verfremdungseffekt, 
when as part of the June 1945 New York production Maurice Ellis, a black actor and the narrator 
of Fear and Misery, had his face painted white at the persistence of Brecht; “an alienation effect 
that also referred to racial discrimination in America, which suggests that Brecht considered the 
play to have implications beyond the particular context of the Third Reich.”45 This is a pertinent 
notion to remind that the present significance of Fear and Misery lies in both its relation to Gestus 
and Haltung and its social malleability of meaning. Due to this meaning-making via external 
                                                 
42 Ibid., lx-lxi. The 1944 English text was seventeen scenes and called The Private Life of the Master Race. 
43 Ibid., lxi. The Horst-Wessel song was the official anthem of Nazi Germany. 
44 Ibid. Piscator quit because he felt Brecht was too frustrating to work with. Berthold Viertel directed.  
45 Ibid. Critics had a contrasting conception feeling the play was largely unnecessary and, even, meaningless since 
WW2 had already ended. 
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societal relations, I show the prominence of emotion and affect, most notably the instigating force 
of fear, in Fear and Misery. Astrid Oesmann asserts, “Brecht places fascist thought in specific 
contexts in order to examine a range of gestures and the ways those gestures change as the contexts 
producing them alter.”46 This plethora of gestures and the compulsions in which society moves 
them are that of Gestus and Haltung. Within these contradictory and coalescing societal and 
psychophysical effects of Haltung and demonstrations of Gestus, so lies a catalyzation of affectual 
expression ready to surface, motivate, and, stimulate prosocially. 
2.2 HALTUNG: THE SOCIAL FORCE OF CONTRADICTION 
Gestus is the essence of an attitude. Haltung is a stance or bearing towards events 
manifesting as an attitude or change of said attitudes due to the social relations. As a concept, 
Gestus is undernourished without being paired with Brecht’s theory of Haltung (pl. Haltungen). 
Whereas Gestus makes the entire social positions of figure visible to an audience, Haltung grapples 
with and enthralls the actor in the idea that the “human” is beholden to our reciprocal social 
development. Theoretically, Haltung “mediates between two uses of ‘intervening thinking’: in 
practical relationships of people to each other and in systematic cognition about people 
(Menschenkunde).”47 Literary scholar Darko Suvin breaks Haltung into three discrete parts:  
1. A refusal of the bourgeois and individualistic concepts of an internalized and atomic 
character (Charakterkopf, Seelenkäse); 2. A revaluation of the Right-wing and militaristic-
cum-servile stress on Strammhalten, that is, statics and hierarchy; 3. An alternative to the 
                                                 
46 Astrid Oesmann, Staging History, 127. 
47 Darko Suvin, “On Stance, Agency, and Emotions in Brecht” (1994), 12. 
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faceless “economics as last instance of all behavior” in orthodox “Historical Materialism” 
from Engels through Kautsky to Stalin.48  
 
In other words, Haltung combats notions of the ultimate “self” and the inescapable individualistic 
psyche to highlight our behavioral plasticity resulting from a respective stance regarding 
relationships and/or the effects of the external social relations.  
Concerning the actor in practice, Brecht contends, “for the smallest social unit is not the 
single person but two people. In life we develop one another.”49 Human behaviors and emotions 
are always in flux as we are consistently shifting to adapt to different social situations. Through an 
actor’s Haltung, this concept finds representation on the stage. David Barnett states, “Haltung 
combines what is usually a mental state in English (attitude) with physical expression (bearing).”50 
Thus, Haltung differs from Gestus in that Gestus is meant to enable the whole embodiment of a 
role or position in society that informs the figure. Haltung or Haltungen provide the specific 
stances or reactions to social constructs or situations. Nonetheless, the actor “blends Gestus 
(position in society) with a repertoire of contradictory Haltungen (responses to specific 
situations).”51 Contradiction is key in the implementation of Gestus and Haltung, as it not only 
textures the execution of both, but aids in portraying why humans may behave in the ways they do, 
especially if said behavior subverts their preceding, present, and future actions. There is no planned 
fate for these figures and no catharsis, only dialectics.  
For example, the scene “Servants of the People” from Fear and Misery aptly displays how 
Haltung can expound socio-behavioral motivations. This very brief playlet involves three 
                                                 
48 Ibid. As Suvin correctly points out, this degrading of the individual is hallmarked in Brecht’s work (See: Mann ist 
Mann). 
49 Brecht and Willett, Brecht on Theatre, 197. 
50 Barnett, Brecht in Practice, 97-98. 
51 Ibid., 99. 
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characters, an SS man, a detainee, and an SS officer. As Brecht did not want an actor or audience 
tied up in the internal psychology of character, we must move to stress the external interactions 
between figures in their social relations. Conversely, one may be inclined to play into an individual 
characterization of good (the withered detainee) and evil (the gruff, authoritative SS man; the 
sadistic SS officer). However, Brecht’s methodology elicits a far more multifaceted portrayal of 
figure. The SS man is notably exhausted and implores the detainee to just admit he is a communist: 
“Why can’t you say no when they ask if you’re a communist, you cunt? It means a lash for you 
and I have to stay in the barracks. I’m so fucking tired.”52 The SS man then asks the detainee to 
flog the ground if the SS officer patrols again, as he does not wish to punish him anymore due to 
exhaustion. When the steps of SS officer are heard, the detainee begins flogging the ground, but 
this “doesn’t sound authentic” so the SS man instructs him to flog a basket, which causes the 
footsteps to stop.53 This disconcerts the SS man, so he retakes his whip and flogs the detainee. 
When the detainee gently asks, “Not my stomach,” the SS man smacks his rear instead.54 
Nevertheless, the SS officer peaks around and instructs to “flog his stomach” which the SS man 
does immediately.55 
 Regarding Haltung, the SS man offers us striking contradictions both due to his Gestus 
and to whom his Haltungen affects and is affected by. His Haltung towards the detainee is tired 
and authoritatively “lenient,” but this swiftly shifts to a contrasting Haltung of agitation and 
obedience when the SS officer changes the social situation with his presence and a subsequent 
order. If Haltung is meant to render the social relations known to an audience and how society 
                                                 
52 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, 140. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Ibid. 
55 Ibid. 
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limits and molds, then the commentary of this small scene is significant. In this theatrical instance 
of challenging fascist behavior, we witness two men withered by work, one in a social position of 
power and the other stripped of agency. A minor episode of frail mercy squashes under this 
Haltungen by way of deference and fear. The SS man’s Haltung becomes clear by the physicalized 
attitude of anxious compliance whilst flogging; his previous clemency now exploited to save 
himself from reprimand and further oppress at the whim of fascism and sadism. 
To achieve these specific embodiments of attitudes, Gestus and Haltung meld to 
complicate and bolster the portrayal of figure as it is related to the present society.56 Though this 
concentration on the external does not negate the figure’s individuality, rather it presents a unity 
between peoples based on facets of class, race, creed, gender, etc.57 Brecht strives to portray that, 
much like in social performance, the behaviors a figure elicits requires an individuality, however, 
these behaviors are restricted and “always dependent on the social conditions of the time.”58 
Therefore, the motivation for the actor is not to reach an apex of complete character that results in 
a succinct ending to dramatic action. Brecht’s dialectical theatre never fixes, and thus never ends, 
but is ever seeking sociopolitical effect. A dialectical actor utilizing Brecht’s methodologies must 
then pursue to display an amalgamation of their Gestus and Haltungen for an audience to analyze 
contrasts both within and between figures. For Brecht, this critique leads to a change in society via 
an observation of society. As a result, the theatre achieves Brecht’s notions of its immense social 
function as these elements coalesce to attempt a sociopolitical fomentation by “representing the 
world dialectically.”59  
                                                 
56 Barnett, Brecht in Practice, 99. 
57 Ibid., 100. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Barnett, Brecht in Practice, 84. 
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I have discussed the behavioral aspects of Haltung as determined by the social relations; 
that is the cognitive thinking about, and the interacting motivations of, Haltung. Whilst cognitive-
behavioral factors are a necessary consideration, I want to shift the focus to how and why 
expressions of the emotions may compel Brechtian theorem and find embodiment in theatrical 
practice (although, this is not to imply a disconnect between cognition and emotion). However, 
before I intervene with affect theories in Part Two, I must provide elucidations of Gestus and its 
apposite significance to Haltung and Fear and Misery of the Third Reich.  
2.3 GESTUS: THE QUINTESSENCE OF A COMPLETE SOCIETAL POSITION 
For Brecht, the term Gestus encompassed multiple manifestations as a loose terminology 
but he parses it most distinctly in his essay “On Gestic Music.” Brecht notes, “‘Gest’ is not 
supposed to mean gesticulation: it is not a matter of explanatory or emphatic movements of the 
hands, but overall attitudes.”60 Gestus is the expression of a stance and signifies the external 
relation between individual and society. This relational societal attitude taken by an actor is 
determined by the holistic Gestus shown to the spectator as “before the actor does anything else 
on the stage, he must take on a stance towards another individual.”61 As such, Gestus is the 
aggregate stance whereas Haltungen are the specific and oft-contradictory stances towards 
circumstances. Gestus underpins all the actor chooses to bear to an audience via physicality, pitch, 
                                                 
60 Brecht and Willett, Brecht on Theatre, 104. Willett notes this essay, supposedly written in 1932, was published 
after Brecht’s death in 1956. 
61 Wekwerth and Hozier, Daring to Play, 66. 
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tone of voice, facial expression, and use of language whereas Haltung indicates social pliability.62 
Ultimately, Gestus is determined by the relationship of the figure with other figures, which incites 
the situations that comprise a Fabel. The external duality is always available, even in a monologue 
where the relation is between actor and themselves.63 Thus, as Brecht rightfully points out, we 
must not assume that Gestus is akin to a gesture or is purely that of a physical embodiment; an act 
that is augmented, extended, or minimized. Gestus regards the whole position of a figure and 
provides a veritable “language of theatre.”64 When Gestus is determined and this language enacted, 
the social conditions become transparent in figure, music, and design. 
Imperatively, Brecht also considered music and set to be gestic. Singing and language can 
have a Gestus and so may any music present in the theatrical performance. As Manfred Wekwerth 
expounds: 
Think, for example, of Eisler’s music for Brecht’s Life of Galileo. Here the songs that 
report on the respective state of science and the scientists are sung in the manner of 
oratorical hymns. The paradox that science and scientist must assert themselves against the 
dogma of the church even when the church is apparently absent is rendered astoundingly 
poetic and tangibly real thanks to the way the sacred Gestus of the music contradicts the 
reporting Gestus of the verse.65     
 
Music can texture a production with its own Gestus that feeds the entire Gestus of a production. 
In turn, it can contradict other aspects of gestic music, Gestus in acting, and any other relevant 
Gestus in a show.  
                                                 
62 In the essay “On Gestic Music,” Brecht is sure to define how language may a form Gestus. He states, "A language 
is gestic when it is grounded in a gest and conveys particular attitudes adopted by the speaker towards other men. 
The sentence ‘pluck the eye that offends thee out’ is less effective from the gestic point of view than ‘if thine eye 
offend thee, pluck it out’. The latter starts by presenting the eye, and the first clause has a defined gest of making an 
assumption; the main clause comes as a surprise, a piece of advice, and a relief.” See: Brecht and Willett, Brecht on 
Theatre, 104.  
63 Wekwerth and Hozier, Daring to Play, 66. 
64 Ibid. 
65 Ibid., 74. 
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Furthermore, the set can take a gestic stance as well. For example, Brecht suggested the 
scenic design of Fear and Misery can utilize “simple indications of scenery (for instance, playing 
against dimly lit swastika flags).”66 As a result, the set can be a gestic stance. Perhaps due to a 
Gestus of foreboding omnipresence in subtlety illuminated swastikas, one ponders the 
pervasiveness and/or implications of representing the Nazi flags, therefore engaging spectators by 
way of their own stance taken towards a gestic set. 
Nevertheless, Gestus as an act relates most apparently to the actor, in that relations or 
contradictory gestic behavior presented on the stage allows for a more complex construction of a 
figure.  An audience is thus at once considering and analyzing the social relations and pressures 
afflicting the figures of a play, whilst actors employ these oft opposing societal forces to fortify a 
malleable, yet more involved sense of their figure. In A Short Organum, Brecht states:  
The realm of attitudes adopted by the characters towards one another is what we call the 
realm of gest. Physical attitude, tone of voice and facial expression are all determined by a 
social gest: the characters are cursing, flattering, instructing one another, and so on. The 
attitudes which people adopt towards one another include even those attitudes which would 
appear to be quite private, such as utterances of physical pain in an illness, or of religious 
faith.67  
 
In this sense, Brecht is outlining Gestus as revealing the unabridged social relations of a figure 
(unlike the particularity of Haltung) whilst also providing means for the cause and effect of their 
behavior. Furthermore, as Brecht notes, Gestus can become highly nuanced and an actor must 
carefully integrate all aspects of their figure via the Gestus employed. The Fabel is determined by 
the way in which figures affect one another socially, and how said Fabel combines all Gestus and 
Haltungen into a sequence of events that can be complicated by figure and actor and commented 
on by an audience. Accordingly, gestic acting follows a statute coined by Brecht as “one-thing-
                                                 
66 Bertolt Brecht, Ralph Manheim, and John Willett, Collected Plays 4 (New York: Vintage Books, 1971), 327. 
67 Brecht and Willett, Brecht on Theatre, 198. Emphasis my own. 
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after-another.”68 Pushing against the fixedness of personality in character, the “one-thing-after-
another” rule enables the actor and spectator to watch figures(s) progress and nix a concrete sense 
of “character.” This combats the “overarching curve” of a character, or as Wekwerth asserts, “In 
‘real life,’ no ‘finished’ character exists before someone develops their actions, rather it develops 
in line with their actions.”69 Figures are shifting and affected by external relations as spectators 
follow a Fabel “one-thing-after-another” and realize the contradictions that move said figures to 
act. 
To elucidate this meaning, I return to Fear and Misery, which Brecht considered being 
particularly gestic in nature. In a journal entry dated August 15th, 1938, Brecht writes: 
Fear and Misery of the Third Reich has now gone to press. lukács has already welcomed 
the SPY as if it were a sinner returned to the bosom of the salvation army. here at last is 
something taken straight from life! he overlooks the montage of 27 scenes, and the fact that 
it is actually only a table of gests, the gest of keeping your mouth shut, the gest of looking 
about you, the gest of sudden fear etc. the pattern of gests in a dictatorship.70 
 
Thus, Brecht underscores a salient feature of Fear and Misery as a play revealing the Gestus of 
dictatorship. For instance, perhaps one of the most striking gestic incidents occurs in scene sixteen 
“Charity Begins at Home.” In this scene, two SA men are delivering a package of goods from the 
Winter Aid Organization to an old woman and her daughter.71 Unwittingly, the old woman 
blabbers a bit too much about her daughter’s dissatisfaction with the Nazi regime: “And she got 
her account book and actually reckoned food had cost her 123 marks more this year than last. 
                                                 
68 Wekwerth and Hozier, Daring to Play, 77. 
69 Ibid., 76. 
70 Brecht and Willett, Bertolt Brecht Journals, 19. Note: Here, Lukács believed that Brecht was utilizing a form of 
realism in Fear and Misery. 
71 The Winter Aid Program was set up to provide supplies and food for impoverished Germans during the harsh 
winter months. 
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Didn’t you, Erna?”72 This does not sit well with the SA men and they both inquire about her 
account book:  
THE FIRST SA MAN.  Where do you keep your account book, young 
woman?  
 
THE SECOND SA MAN.  And who are you in the habit of showing it to?73  
 
Feeling that the daughter’s findings may lead, or have led, to her spreading lies about the Nazi 
government, the SA men seize her:  
THE FIRST SA MAN. And if she goes about spreading alarm and 
despondency, are we allowed to object then?   
 
THE SECOND SA MAN.  What’s more I don’t remember her saying “Heil 
Hitler” all that loud when we came in. Do you?74  
 
Frantically, the old woman implores them to stop, but suspect they have come across a “nice nest 
of Marxists” they do not listen.75 Intensely distraught, the old woman shouts “Heil Hitler!” 
feverously as a form of compensation resulting in her retching up the apple provided to her by the 
Winter Aid. The scene ends with her spewing “Heil Hitler!” in between heaves of vomit.  
The old woman’s Gestus of abrupt terror and her gestic language are just two examples of 
“the gest of sudden fear” that Brecht discusses. As John and Ann White clarify regarding Gestus 
and language:  
Language itself is also a Gestus within Brecht’s theatrical sign-system, as are such 
signifiers as uniforms or the absence thereof, who sits and who stands during an encounter, 
an actor’s stage position and the codes of socio-political interaction: the compulsory “Heil 
Hitler” greeting, the use of “Volksgenosse” (national comrade) as a form of address, and 
whether or not civilian of the Third Reich choose to stress their allegiance to paramilitary 
organizations in public or even in the confines of their own home.76   
 
                                                 
72 Brecht and Willett, Fear and Misery, 73. 
73 Ibid., 74. 
74 Ibid.  
75 Ibid. 
76 John and Ann White, Bertolt Brecht's Furcht Und Elend Des Dritten Reiches, 84. 
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The Gestus of the old woman is thus displaying the sociopolitical ramifications of a totalitarian 
state wherein fear drives violence and supports misery. This notion goes beyond any individual 
characterizations and provides a connection between figure and the social environment. Brecht 
summarizes this social weight:  
naturally the individual can only be reached via the masses. yet it is the individual who is 
subjected to the full tragic force of the horrors of the development of the human race and 
the classes (‘the motor becomes the brake’).77  
 
The social conditions have spurred the old woman’s terror. Her frantic “Heil Hitler! Heil Hitler!” 
resonates with none and does not heal the sociopolitical fissure she has just caused. The gestic 
language is contradictory as the old woman does not spout it in a fervor for the Führer, but to save 
her kin. The experience leaves her throwing up the apple given to her in charity by the “good-will” 
of the Führer and placing her body, facial expression, voice, and entire bearing in a state of 
contradiction. The spectator thus critiques Gestus and other elements present as, one would hope, 
wrong and unjust, but, more crucially as social conditions that require alteration. Consequently, 
Gestus enables an actor to build figure via the external representation of their role in society, and 
thus allows an audience to view one’s Gestus and Haltung/Haltungen to analyze the contradictions 
and interconnections between other figures. Gestus is “the externalization of the socially 
significant” and as such is rooted most noticeably in notions of how people affect one another.78  
Currently, I have discussed Gestus and Haltung to show the central presence of these 
theories in Fear and Misery. As I indicate above, contradiction is an essential facet of performing 
the dialectical theatre for spectator critique and observation. How these dialectics involve the 
Gestus and Haltung of emotion must come under more ample consideration. In Part Two, I shift 
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my concentration to theories of emotional expressiveness to examine the Gestus and Haltung of 
affectual fear as a catalyst for the provocation of prosocial behavior in spectator for possible 
societal change. 
 31 
3.0  PART TWO 
Affecting with Affect: Evincing Fear in Fear and Misery of the Third Reich 
Emotions change how we see the world and how we interpret the actions of others. We do 
not seek to challenge why we are feeling a particular emotion; instead, we seek to confirm it. 
 
Paul Ekman, Emotions Revealed79  
 
 
 
 
In the epigraph above, Paul Ekman considers the emotions as influencers on the human 
perception of behavior and motivation in self and society. Thus, when we experience emotion we 
intend to feel with rather than act against these inherent processes. Conversely, I argue that 
Brecht’s dialectical theatre is an appreciable theatrical environment to represent the emotions and 
experimentally complicate their utilization. As Gestus and Haltung portray the social weight of 
the effects of external relations, I look now to how emotional communication can produce 
prosocial effects via Brecht’s theatrical medium, especially regarding the display and identification 
of fear. Gestus details the manifestation of a social reality through a whole bearing towards 
situations informed by physicality, tone of voice, spoken language, staging, set, and music. 
Additionally, Brecht’s explanation of Gestus includes facial expression.80 Therefore, 
manifestations of emotional constructions are also a mode of Gestus and Haltung that thrust forth 
for scrutiny by the spectator. I contend that this allows for an emphasis on emotional relations in 
Brechtian performance by marking how emotion and affect affects others; contemporaneously 
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opposing popular and critical conceptions of the “emotion-less” Brecht. Specifically, with a 
concentration on the conveyance of emotion via the human face and body, figures can represent 
emotion on the stage and, with Gestus and Haltung/Haltungen, accent their functionality as means 
for effective verbal and non-verbal social communication.  
I focus on the Gestus of emotional expressiveness and resulting Haltungen for two 
pertinent reasons: 1.) Emotions and affects are motivating and impact human behavior through 
societal dynamics and 2.) emotional communication, verbal or not, is of immense significance to 
our species for the delivery of individual and social information.81 As a result, by attuning my 
analysis on this aspect of Gestus and Haltung/Haltungen, one can view the emotions as a social 
tool. As David Barnett observes, “Brecht’s theatre is not only interested in frustrating the simple 
communication of emotion to the audience because it wants to resist automatic empathetic 
response, but also because emotions themselves are worthy of investigation.”82 When paired with 
all elements of Brechtian performance, the emotions may also be ripe to stir change, as this study 
reveals. 
Emotions, in the most common perception of the term, dominate and texture human 
experience consistently throughout one’s life.83 Though standard cultural conventions may enable 
us to state what emotions “are,” it is a difficult concept to pin down definition-wise. In psychology, 
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the typical explanation of emotion may consider it “a complex reaction pattern, involving 
experiences, behavioral, and physiological elements, by which the individual attempts to deal with 
a personally significant matter or event.”84 However, these psychological delineations often 
forefront the personal aspects of emotion rather than first depicting them as an intricate method of 
verbal and non-verbal social communication via affectual expression in face and body.  
Also, it is important to repeat how my use of the term emotion differs from affect. Emotion 
is the specific “feeling state” of neurobiological reactions to human experience and environmental 
stimuli. This position is suitably defined by affectual neuroscientist Jaak Panksepp who states, 
“The core function of emotional systems is to coordinate many types of behavioral and 
physiological processes in the brain and body” and as a result these “neural activities continue at 
low levels for extended periods of time, they generate moods and, ultimately, such personality 
dimensions as the differential tendency to be happy, irritable, fearful, or melancholy.”85 In relation 
to the separation of emotion and affect, affect is the occurrence and embodiment of the emotion. 
As I utilize it presently, affectual expression is thus the display of a discrete emotional state. These 
facial constructions then relate most prominently to how we communicate socially and how said 
emotion states and affectual portrayals influence external human relations. 
In his book Ideas and Realities of Emotion, Brian Parkinson attempts to confront our 
commonplace notions of emotion as personal and reconsider it a social method of interpersonal 
communication.86 Beholding to Brechtian thought, emotion and affect is therefore political and 
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dialectical as it impacts and resides in social relationships. With Brecht’s Gestus and Haltung as 
the mode of performative catalyzation, the emotions venture beyond concerns of individual 
psychology and maintain, I argue, their primary purpose as a conveyer of verbal and non-verbal 
social information. Additionally, when applied with Brechtian dialectics, emotional 
expressiveness may begin to not only communicate, but also activate politically.  
Furthermore, Paul Ekman’s research has provided strong foundational support for a 
universal theory of affectual expression and builds upon Charles Darwin’s assertions of emotion 
as an evolved product of natural selection. This universal theory proposes that all humans 
physiologically express emotions in the same manner, quite often with the six “core” emotions of 
happiness, sadness, fear, disgust, anger, and surprise.87 Of course, this universality is of great social 
and evolutionary benefit, especially regarding non-verbal communication. Take fear for example, 
perhaps the most eagerly studied “core” facial expression.88  If there were an event, predator, or 
object that we should be fearful of to avoid injury or death, non-verbally and quickly interpreting 
fear in the faces and bodies of others protects us. In other words, we may see a flash of fear in 
someone running past us in the woods. We need not know what is causing this display, but that it 
would likely be wise to run along with them. This is useful for the theatre as it feeds into our 
evolutionary and social proclivities thus engaging audiences and performers in both conscious and 
unconscious realms of emotion. I will come back to fear momentarily, not only to examine its 
situatedness in Fear and Misery but also its curious effects on prosocial behavior.  
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This concept leads me to another necessary point regarding the emotions in relation to 
Brechtian theatre: Emotions and affects are motivating. The psychologist Silvan Tomkins was one 
of the most forward-thinking proponents of emotion as a primary motivator in humans and 
established the face as the main site of affect.89 Moreover, Tomkins’ studies began to cement the 
universality of emotions and provided noteworthy results showing our ability to comprehend and 
interpret emotional facial expressions across cultures.90 Tomkins is sure to state that creating a 
purposeful emotional representation still “may be a genuine signal of an idea or intention.”91 In 
Brecht’s theatre, we must attempt to control performative affectual expression in such a way that 
related Gestus and Haltungen subsequently display said constructs physiologically to an audience. 
Hence, I place Brechtian performance in conversation with affect theories of emotional 
expressiveness to involve the dialectical theatre in both voluntary and involuntary methods that 
formulate realistic, yet deliberate, representations of affectual expressions (when, of course, 
keeping in mind both purposeful communication and the prominent factor of chance in theatrical 
performance).  
Regarding Gestus and Haltung, John Willett states we should be able to “read movements 
Brecht’s figures make on stage as revelatory in that social sense.”92 The ability to “read” this 
behavior by interweaving an affectual approach bolsters the theatre and Brecht’s theorem. Brecht 
wanted Gestus to be a “language of theatre,” and, likewise, humans also innately learn the language 
of the face and body for social and personal interaction and survival. For instance, the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) constitutes a detailed classification of discrete Action Units with twenty-
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eight main codes that are marked on an intensity scale from A-E. By examining frames of video 
or images, researchers can use FACS to study these expressions of emotions and uncover their 
formations in varying empirical contexts. As the studies of Paul Ekman show, the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) enables researchers to take a multitude of subjective observations or 
“readings” to construct objective accounts of emotional expression.93  
Take, for example, the meaning of a monologue from The Messingkauf Dialogues. The 
Messingkauf Dialogues is a partial work written by Brecht around the end of the 1930s and early 
1940s and is, essentially, an attempt at a play of theory. Here, the Dramaturg speaks and offers 
exposition as to an experimental process Brecht performed on his wife, Helene Weigel:    
The Augsburger filmed Weigel making herself up. He cut the film up, and each frame 
showed a complete facial expression, self-contained and with its own meaning. “You see 
what sort of actress she is,” he said admiringly. “Each gesture can be analysed into as many 
gestures as you like, and all of them perfect. Everything is there for the sake of something 
else, and at the same time for its own. Not only the jump is beautiful, but also the run-up.” 
But what mattered most to him was that every movement of the muscles as she made up 
brought about a perfect expression of her personality. The people he showed these pictures 
to, asking them what the various expressions meant, suggested such things as anger, gaiety, 
envy, compassion. He showed them to Weigel too, telling her that she only needed to know 
her own expressions in order to be able to express the various moods without always 
having to feel them.94  
 
Firstly, it would seem, Brecht’s use of frames of expressions is much akin to the eventual studies 
of Ekman and other researchers studying the universality of emotional expressiveness. Second, the 
present notion that one’s knowledge of these portrayals is enough to display them without 
experiencing said emotions is like Tomkins’ assertion that emotion is still meaningful in instances 
when we knowingly and socially express them. Lastly, it would appear Brecht places immense 
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value in the whole meaning of a facial expression with a specific focus on the shifting musculature 
of the face. These muscles lead to distinct movements in the face and these emotional constructions 
are, according to Brecht, the embodiment of one’s personality. 
On the stage, emotions are not simply subjective but can become partially objective, in that 
our cognition interprets them naturally via verbal and non-verbal emotional communication. By 
displaying physiological representations of affect for “reading,” we interpret the emotion as 
meaningful, can comment on it, and further support spectator comprehension of a figure’s 
behavior, contradictory or otherwise. For instance, in a conceptual framework for Fear and Misery, 
Brecht proposes “a troop carrier rumbles on to the stage at the beginning and end, and twice during 
the play, and is full of actors playing soldiers with chalk-white faces, in order to exaggerate the 
fear that propels the action of the whole play.”95 This marked fear is not only presented; it opposes 
the militarized nature of the soldiers. A contrasting expression of fear undermines the soldier’s 
uniform regiment and symbol of militaristic strength. The spectator is then to take this information 
and question why figures are behaving as they are. Emotional engagement is thus to “perform 
emotion as in speech marks, so that the audience does not get caught up with the figure’s feelings, 
but rather considers what they signify.”96 The idea of affectual “speech marks” is a vital distinction 
and posits a Brechtian approach to emotion that is fundamentally contradictory to shape figures 
for spectator critique and analysis. 
Without any knowledge of the scientific and psychological advancements that have 
emerged in recent years, Brecht’s method of observing the emotions is fruitful for the assertions 
of my current study. For instance, an actor could take videos of themselves in conversation, in 
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routine, or “making themselves up,” as Brecht did with Weigel. This process shares a considerable 
closeness to how researchers study facial expressions, especially when using the Facial Action 
Coding System (FACS) applied in research on emotion displays. Then, one can splice together the 
moments of whole facial expression and analyze the physical movements of the face. Perhaps, an 
actor may even show these pictures to others and let them consider the portrayals of expression. 
The emphasis being, of course, on the discrete muscle movements that comprise emotional facial 
constructions as a technique to augment and complicate figures and the actors that depict them. I 
will explore this idea more thoroughly in the coming discussion on representations of fear in Fear 
and Misery. The face and body are the essential sites of emotional and social verbal and non-verbal 
communication. In an array of minute and striking arrangements, so resides not only qualities that 
can comprise Gestus and Haltung, but an apparatus for inciting prosociality in spectator(s) as well. 
3.1 BRECHT & EMOTION: COMPLICATION, NOT NEGATION 
To synthesize these concepts, I turn to Brecht’s complex view of the emotions in theatrical 
performance. Elly Konijn notes, “For Brecht believability is not only a matter of technical 
command over emotional portrayal, but also revealing conflicting aspects in people.”97 As I show 
above, this technical command enables possibilities for both proper depictions of the emotions 
through an ostensibly scientific technique, but also amplifies and can push against our 
understandings of emotional expression in theatre. Moreover, viewpoints that Brecht’s dialectical 
theatre constitutes an extreme rationality and negation of emotion perhaps sprouts from his earlier 
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and more radical writings. In his years before self-exile, Brecht’s polemical spirit towards staples 
of bourgeois theatre prompted a more distinct divide between emotion and reason in theatre.98 
Though, a shift occurs in 1939. In a letter to an unknown “Comrade M,” Brecht states, “Some 
people have read into it the notion that I come out ‘against emotion and in favor of the intellect.’ 
This is of course not the case. I don’t see how thoughts and feelings can be kept apart.”99 It is 
thought that Brecht’s time in exile, and further dissemination of his ideas, garnered critique that 
demanded necessary clarifications. The early inklings of the emotion debate, it would seem, stem 
from the differentiation between “feeling” and “reason” in Brecht’s chart on the “epic” theatre.100 
Though, this would spark elucidations on the emotions that would endure to the last versions of a 
constantly revising dramatic theorem.  
In a journal entry dated March 4th, 1941, Brecht writes: 
it becomes clear to me that the antagonistic configuration “reason in this corner – emotion 
in that’ has to go. the relationship of ratio and emotion, with all its contradictions, has to 
be examined minutely, and opponents cannot be allowed simply to be present epic theatre 
as rational and counter-emotional. the “instincts” – automated reactions to experience – 
which have become contrary to our interests. the bogged down, one-track emotions which 
are no longer under the control of reason. against that the emancipated ratio of the 
physicists with their mechanical formulism. be that as it may, even if the interests of artists 
ought not to be expressed in especially emotional terms – probably they are – they do 
express themselves in an emotional form. the epic principles guarantee a critical attitude 
on the part of the audience, but that attitude is highly emotional.101  
 
Again, he dismisses the debate between reason and emotion, whilst focusing on two significant 
points: the “epic” theatre requires a critical audience and the spectator is emotional. Thus, the 
presentation of the emotions should come forth in such a manner that they require commentary 
and critique from the spectator. Essentially, emotions are unavoidable. In his later years, this was 
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recognized again in a long dialogue about the emotions in his theatre, but I will highlight the most 
salient remark: “We make no attempt to share the emotions of the characters we portray, but these 
emotions must nonetheless be fully and movingly represented, nor must they be treated with 
coldness but likewise with an emotion of some force.”102 As such, this emotional effect is not to 
connect with a spectator and only cause them to be reciprocally happy, angry, or fearful, but to 
complicate the representational presentation of emotion. 
In turn, if the emotions become fixed in character, not figure, this prevents contradictions 
from affecting social relations. In the social sciences, psychologists have attempted to define the 
inner-workings of the emotions as “intrapsychic,” in that they manifest in reaction to specific 
personal and social criterion which is beholden to a theoretical structure of psychological and 
neurological operations.103 In other words, I may be able to explain the source of fear in a series 
of chalk-faced troops as meditated, in part, by amygdalae processes.104 However, emotional 
occurrences are far too ubiquitous and socially rooted “to develop one all-purpose explanatory 
account that is true for every conceivable instance of emotion.”105  
The same holds true for emotion in theatre and I do not wish to imply an ultimate form of 
affectual expression via Gestus and Haltung. Rather, what I endeavor to detail is the significance 
of emotional verbal and non-verbal communication for the conveyance of information in everyday 
life and in the theatrical medium. A single expression by itself can lead to a variety of relational 
and social interpretations. We will not know why someone is mad, glad, or sad by facial expression 
alone; the social milieu provides this.  
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Herein lies the correspondence of Gestus and Haltung. The combination of providing 
information emotionally thorough verbal and non-verbal communication and the ability to 
contextualize said emotion that motivates the individual and the collective is of astounding 
importance to us Homo sapiens. With Haltung, accentuated emotional significance is not simply 
due to its residence in the external social relations, but in how it contrasts and buttresses Gestus. 
Brian Parkinson acknowledges, “emotional phenomena may be circumscribed mainly by the 
functions that they serve in everyday social life.”106 As Haltung denotes the diverging changes of 
and in a figure to particular situations, theatrical performance of one’s Haltungen ensures the 
spectator is able to view how the society can greatly impact and change a figure. Moreover, simply 
splicing out Brechtian concepts like Gestus and Haltung does not exactly represent “Brechtian 
theatre.” Nor, does ignoring any other constituent parts of his theories allow for Brecht’s ideas to 
coalesce and work in performance. My focus on affectual facial expression is not to assert a 
dominance of these tactics but supplement that which, I contend, fits Brecht’s dialectical theatre 
yet has been undertheorized by studies of emotional science in theatrical performance. 
3.2 HOW AN INVENTOR MIGHT LAUGH: THE FIRST PRODUCTION OF FEAR 
AND MISERY  
The importance of Fear and Misery lies in its critique of fascism for political effect. 
Though, how this purpose plays to spectators is also substantial, if not the most crucial aspect of 
inciting prosocial behavior. A commentary on audience reaction from Brecht’s own account of the 
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first production of Fear and Misery comes from The Messingkauf Dialogues. In a discussion 
between The Dramaturg and The Philosopher, they converse about Fear and Misery, specifically, 
the hodgepodge actors of the original cast and the nature of spectator response to the performance. 
The Dramaturg delineates the nature of this company: 
A few years back when I was visiting Paris I went to a small theatre where a tiny group of 
German exiles were acting a few scenes from a play showing conditions at home. I’ve 
never come across a group whose members were so widely varied in background, training 
and talents. There was a working man who could hardly have set foot on a stage before and 
spoke in dialect, and alongside him a great actress whose resources, gifts and stage 
education are possibly unrivalled. They had two things in common: the fact that they had 
all fled their country in face of the house-painter’s hordes’ and a particular style of 
acting.107  
 
Here, The Dramaturg marks the commonality present in the proletarian cast of the original 
production of Fear and Misery. The unity of circumstances and political stance is, at least in part, 
a crucial and perhaps unforeseen aspect of performing Fear and Misery. It would seem Brecht 
desired the work to maintain a simple style that could be produced by workers or those with little 
to no actor-training and even fewer design resources.108 Thus, the drive of the specific acting style 
The Dramaturg references is described succinctly: “Their job as political human beings was to use 
art or anything else to further their social cause.”109 Regarding the first cast of Fear and Misery, 
the actors are united by their sociopolitical motivations that negate questions of talent, background, 
or method.110 Then, the political effect can be supported through social relatability, context, and 
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personal references or improvisations. The actors call upon the spectator to analyze the familiar 
made strange, but this will not succeed without emphasis on the cause and effect of social relations. 
Specifically, a cause and effect that both confronts the audience and employs “local” tools such as 
dialects. In turn, this use makes political matters matter, as a propagation of sociopolitical effect 
relays to individuals and couples with a call to the communitas at large.  
In fact, The Dramaturg cites the efficaciousness of the first production of Fear and Misery 
as a result of accenting “the ensuing development, the further continuation: as it were, on the 
mechanics of the episodes. On the interplay of cause and effect.”111 The cause and effect of the 
external sociality is thus dynamic, contradictory, and pursuing a particular level of insecurity:  
THE PHILOSOPHER.   …the essence of this folk art is insecurity… And 
insecurity is the desire for knowledge too.  
  
THE DRAMATURG. So it’s possible to enjoy insecurity. 
 
THE PHILOSOPHER.  Remember the English saying: “It’s an ill wind that 
blows nobody any good.” People want to be made 
just as insecure as they really are.112 
 
An emphasis on insecurity is relevant as it implies a contradiction. In a state of insecurity, we seek 
knowledge, answers, solutions, or in dialectical terms, insecurity between thesis and antithesis 
leads to the wanting of a synthesis and subsequent reformation. Also, Brecht is proposing that 
insecurity is at the heart of this folk art, a theatre about people and their relationships. In other 
words, insecurity in self and collective precedes change, if not harkens it. Thus, there is a pleasure 
in insecurity and an indulgence in contradiction, but these aspects of performance are also a 
necessity for social revolution. Further, it would seem Brecht posits insecurity as instigator of, and 
reliant on, chance. In Fear and Misery, figures are relentlessly insecure about their social relations 
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as these so often predicate on fear. However, the presented Gestus and Haltung of dictatorship 
during the first production of Fear and Misery did not instill fear in spectator via the portrayal of 
horror but was instead met with its own antithesis: laughter.   
Pertinently, Brecht recounts the time he witnessed a troupe of exiled Germans put on a 
piece of proletarian theatre in a monologue from The Messingkauf Dialogues. I quote it here at 
length to show the dialectical situatedness of the Gestus and Haltung of fear in Fear and Misery. 
The Dramaturg reports: 
The play they were performing was Fear and Misery of the Third Reich. I was told it 
consisted of twenty-four little plays, of which they performed seven or eight these plays 
showed how the people in your country are behaving under the housepainter’s rod of iron. 
You saw people of pretty well all classes, and how they resisted or knuckled under. You 
saw the fear of the oppressed and the fear of the oppressors. It was like a great collection 
of gestures, observed with artistry: the quarry looking back over his shoulder (the pursuer’s 
look too); the sudden silences; the hand that flies to one’s own mouth when one is about to 
say too much, and the hand that falls on the wanted man’s shoulder; the extorted lie, the 
whispered truth, the mutual distrust of lovers, and much more. But what was so unusual 
was that the players never performed these ghastly episodes in such a way that the 
spectators were tempted to call “Stop.” The spectators didn’t seem in any way to share the 
horror of those on the stage, and as a result there was repeatedly laughter among the 
audience without doing any damage to the profoundly serious character of the performance. 
For this laughter seemed to apply to the stupidity that found itself having to make use of 
force, and to the helplessness that took the shape of brutality. Bullies were seen as men 
tripping over, criminals as men who have made a mistake or allowed themselves to be 
taken in. The spectators’ laughter was finely graduated. It was a happy laughter when the 
quarry outwitted his pursuer, a contented laughter when somebody uttered a good, true 
word. That’s how an inventor might laugh on finding the solution after a long effort: it was 
as obvious as that, and he took so long to see it!113   
 
This monologue is key for two reasons. It details the initial audience perception of Fear and Misery 
and how to achieve said spectator reception via contradictions in Gestus and Haltung. Spectators 
witness ubiquitous fear; the ultimate emotion linking all who are living in a fascist dictatorship. 
This is the Gestus and Haltung of fear: the frightened look to, the horror of bad faith, constant 
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observation, unseen ears, and accidentally speaking your mind, ever residing within the external 
social relations. These moments are all contradictory, as fear subverts positions of power; terror 
nullifies the complicit composure or meager resistance of the oppressed. Despite this, fear 
confronts spectator reaction with its own contradictions. As The Dramaturg notes, the Gestus and 
Haltung of fear had not attached itself reciprocally in spectator interpretation, rather in contrast 
propelled by laughter. However, the humor at the expense of the oppressors, the comedy of 
demoralizing brutes, and the asinine nature of fanaticism is not victimizing or empowering any 
social group present. Fear equalizes all. These scenarios of figures bear the Gestus and Haltung of 
Nazi rule providing terror and its realities as a thesis. The spectators, not entirely enraptured by 
these tales of horror, provide the critical antithesis with potential laughter and an acknowledgment 
regarding the fragility of fascism. The dialectical synthesis may be in this recognition of fear thus 
bolstering ideologies against totalitarianistic tendencies, governments, or social entities. Though, 
I now argue, with evidence from the field of psychology, the facial expression of fear has far more 
prosocial implications than only laughter at the idiocy of brutality. 
3.3  BEARING FEAR: PARSING THE PROSOCIAL POSSIBILITIES OF FEAR AND 
MISERY OF THE THIRD REICH 
Paul Ekman asserts, “The core of fear is the possibility of pain, physical or 
psychological.”114 Given this knowledge, it easy to comprehend why experiencing fear is in some 
way motivating. In a 2007 study titled “Accurate Identification of Fear Facial Expressions Predicts 
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Prosocial Behavior,” researchers Abagail Marsh, Megan Kozak, and Nalini Ambady discover a 
connection between the facial expression of fear and prosocial behavior. To examine the 
mechanisms undergirding prosociality, Marsh et al. conducted three studies that conclude more 
accurate recognition of facially expressed fear is a much higher indicator of prosocial behavior 
than the other “core” emotional expressions.115 Barring any form of psychopathy or other 
antisocial tendencies, the interpretation of fear leads to higher monetary promises or prosocial 
perceptions of others. This most likely relates to the relationship between fear and distress. 
Therefore, resulting prosocial behavior from witnessing fear may stem from an evolutionary and 
social tendency to benefit group cohesion by placating individual and collective unrest.   
Similarly, a 2008 study conducted at MIT examined the neural responses of the amygdalae 
to facial expressions of fear. Comparing two groups (Native Japanese and U.S. Caucasians), Chiao 
et al. discovered higher amygdalae reaction to facial expressions of fear when the faces were 
members of their respective cultures.116 This cultural conditioning affecting neural response is 
perhaps an implicit bias and thus significant when considering the interpretation of fear 
expressions.  
Moreover, other evidence towards a recognition of fear expression and prosociality holds 
true in a 2017 study utilizing socio-economic games for examining reciprocity and prosocial 
behavior. Not only did prosocially-minded individuals recognize distress signals like fear better, 
these participants were themselves more facially expressive, suggesting a benefit to social 
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relationships.117 All this said, a focus on the facial expression of the emotions must not make 
another important display tool secondary: the body. Researchers have rightfully noted that studies 
of the face are isolated, perhaps even stereotyped (Ekman’s Pictures of Facial Affect and similar 
catalogs are quite often used). This leaves a discrepancy between research tools and real-life 
representations of affectual expression. Perhaps most surprisingly, recent research bolsters the 
significance of Gestus and Haltung in Brechtian figure(s). Lior et al.’s 2017 study comparing real-
life face and body expressions from online videos/images and an instructed Bochum Emotional 
Stimulus Set shows that real-life bodily expressions of fear were often more recognized than the 
face or provided greater contextualization for the present facial expression.118 As Brecht stressed 
the need for the actor to participate in observation, this evidence provides support for the whole 
stance of Gestus and specific Haltungen to encompass face and body for integrated meaning. By 
practicing observation, expressions may be more prosocially efficacious if they reflect both 
empirical and real-life constructions of fear. 
In other words: inferring facial and bodily fear in others may lead to prosocial behavior. 
Conceptually, I have stated much regarding how affectual expressions of fear find representation 
in Fear and Misery and by the actor via Gestus and Haltung. Although, can this truly be 
accomplished on the stage? A higher recognition of fear incited prosociality and as such fear must 
be presented accurately. It is necessary to understand the possible implicit cultural biases regarding 
this representation, too (will a white spectator respond as prosocially to the fear of a black 
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performer despite both being from the same culture?). A possible entry-point to accurate displays 
of fear is Susana Bloch’s ALBA Emoting technique. ALBA Emoting is “the first method to 
identify specific, universal patterns in these reproducible aspects of emotional expression, and 
systematize them into a technique to produce emotions at will.”119 By moving through three 
phases, an actor first focuses on the muscular accuracy and movements of affectual expression, 
then an introduction of emotion separate from any cognitive stimulus, and finally an integration of 
these psychophysiological constructs into text, situation, character, figure, etc. Rhonda Blair states:  
This process is an embodiment of the paradox, or duality, of the actor’s spontaneity: the 
effector patterns are repeated so that they become automatic or habituated, i.e., organically 
spontaneous, thereby freeing the actor to be consciously spontaneous and impulsive in the 
moment.120    
 
In effect, ALBA Emoting situates affectual expressions as first physiological and then 
contextualized in performance. Methods of impulsiveness now become more like those 
representations in everyday life, effectively adding a sense of natural portrayals of the emotions in 
the face and body. Hence, Blair raises the question: “What is authentic about weeping, if it is 
generated solely through physical self-manipulation?”121 I would argue that the emotions are real 
if the expression relays to the spectator properly. Intuitively, Blair contends ALBA Emoting holds 
implications for and buttresses Stanislavskian performance theory and methodology. I assert the 
same applies to Brecht’s theatre. 
A secondary entry-point could be learning and experiencing FACS training, the coding 
system of emotionally expressive “Action Units.” This approach is somewhat similar ALBA 
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Emoting, which is influenced by Ekman’s work, but homes in on a particular academic knowledge 
of these discrete facial movements that comprise affectual representations. Businesses, 
government agencies, and, occasionally, actors will often utilize FACS training to create a more 
emotionally tuned work environment, whilst others seek this information to detect deception. 
Melded or separate, these psychophysiological approaches should be kept in mind for the coming 
section, and I must clarify that I am not prescribing these methods to actor-training in Brechtian 
performance. Rather, they offer more concrete elucidations of how affectual expressions of the 
face can potentially affect and/or foment prosociality in spectators. 
In Fear and Misery, we see a marked focus on situations about, and the expression of, fear. 
The concept of a buggy of chalk and fearful-faced troops is an excellent example of this. Still, 
multiple emotional states texture the performance throughout. Whilst complex intermingling of 
emotional experiences should always be apparent, I will highlight significant moments of fear, 
both as an indication of expression to the spectator and its prosocial meanings.    
Sadness and fear appear throughout Fear and Misery, though, in scene twenty-three “Job 
Creation” we see specific stage directions to weep:  
The WIFE.  Sobbing. No, I know.  
The MAN.  as his wife again bursts into sobs. Pull yourself 
together Martha. You shouldn’t say that should sort 
of thing, Mrs. Dietz.122  
 
The Wife’s brother has died in a plane accident and she is in mourning. If the Wife is expressing 
such clear sadness, then naturally we may get the gist of her current emotional state (think back to 
Blair’s earlier query). However, what makes this scene particularly interesting is not only the 
Wife’s sadness but the reaction of the Man (her husband) and their Neighbor. She is told 
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continually that her brother’s death is justified, and he died serving Hitler’s army. Her sorrowful 
expressions are undermined by the others repression of emotion, and, as a result, they believe she 
should not feel sadness: “Don’t get worked up, Martha. It won’t help.”123 Such contradiction takes 
place in these social relations that the Wife eventually proclaims in an outburst: “Don’t anyone tell 
me I’m not going into mourning! If they can slaughter him I have a right to cry.”124 She then 
continues to harangue against the needless death caused by the stirrings of Hitler’s war, a contrast 
to the order that must be upheld in a fascist state. The Man looks on with horror and attempts to 
cover her mouth whilst the Neighbor objects that she must not state such things. The physical 
gestic action of “shutting someone up” and her role in society as wife and woman is clear: “Just 
shut up, would you? It won’t help.”125 This enables dialectical contrast in Gestus and Haltung to 
occur, in that, the Wife’s sorrow (thesis) is met with complacency and fear (antithesis) from the 
others and these contradictions instigate a synthesis of prosocial action that calls forth a new thesis 
with the ending line: “What does help then? Do something that does!”126 As such, the complexity 
of all affectual expressions is what incites, or at the very least considers, change via mediation by 
the external social relations of the figures present.  
In scene three “The Chalk Cross,” we witness perhaps the best exemplar of situational fear. 
An SA man, home for a meal, converses with his chauffeur, cook, and maidservant girlfriend. 
When the maidservant’s brother, titled “The Worker,” comes to visit he is slightly skittish and 
apprehensive of the SA man’s presence. Soon after, a “game” ensues and the SA man and Worker 
perform play-acting whilst lobbing insults at Hitler, the work camps, and the Worker’s ilk. What 
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causes the fraught tension in this scene is the exposition regarding how the SA select people to be 
taken to the work camps: 
THE SA MAN.  No longer acting: Right, then in you go into the 
office and they’ll pick you up bang off. 
 
THE WORKER.  What, without you leaving the line and following me 
in? 
 
THE SA MAN.    Yeh. 
 
THE WORKER.  And without you giving someone a wink, which 
might look fishy? 
 
THE SA MAN.    Without me winking. 
 
THE WORKER.    How’s it done then? 
 
THE SA MAN.  Ha, you’d like to know that trick. Well, stand up, and 
show us your back. He turns him round by the 
shoulders, so that everyone can see his back. Then to 
the maidservant: Seen it? 
 
THE MAIDSERVANT.   Look he’s got a white cross on it.  
 
THE COOK.     Right between his shoulders. 
 
THE CHAUFFEUR.    So he has. 
 
THE SA MAN.  And how did he get it? Shows the palm of his hand. 
See, just a little white chalk cross and there’s its 
impression large as life.127  
 
This moment that concludes the play-acting between the SA man and the Worker is, as always, 
determined by the external social relations. The Worker’s Haltung of wary, yet bawdy frustration 
has changed to a Haltung of fright due to the SA man’s little trick. Whilst in “jest,” this experience 
disconcerts the Worker and he leaves making clear whose side he is on:  
                                                 
127 Ibid., 17. 
 52 
That’s set my mind at rest. Me, I don’t ever come across that sort of subversive element. 
I’d gladly confront them if I did. Only I’m not quite so quick to the punch as you. Clearly 
and distinctly: All right, Minna, thanks a lot and Heil Hitler!128  
 
In part, the pressure of this scene relies on the “game” between the SA man and the Worker 
that allows them to state their concerns with both parties (the Nazis and the Communists). The 
Worker is threatened by this action and the notion of being “marked” is no less comforting than 
living in fear of stating your words in a problematic manner around an authoritarian. Of course, 
instilling this fear is a tried and true tactic as the SA man states earlier in the scene: “You’re a right 
bunch of turds. Make me sick, you do. Not a bloody soul got the guts to open his mouth.”129 The 
contradiction is that the SA man wants everyone to join in his “game” and make a joke, but no one 
is willing out of fear they may say something wrong. Feeling “marked” by the chalk cross, the 
Worker experiences a fear-filled Haltung shift, perhaps accompanied by a facial and/or bodily 
expression of fear. This stance presented to the spectator contextualizes in the external social 
relations and incorporates a cognitive and psychophysical aspect to the portrayal of figure. 
Moreover, these notions also mingle with political ideology (fascism vs. an ostensible 
“Left”) providing the possibility for prosocial effects. It is in this cognitive, emotional, and 
Brechtian soup that a move towards prosocial behavior is realized. Testing this hypothesis, let us 
consider a spectator like that of the first production of Fear and Misery. Moments of horror are 
met laughter as those present understand and critique the absurdity and fear-laden nature of 
fascism. During “The Chalk Cross,” the worker flashes psychophysiological fear after he is 
“marked.” As Marsh et al.’s study displays, recognition of the fear expression predicts prosocial 
behavior. Now, pair this with an explicit message for political effect: fascism leads to fear and 
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misery in and for all. Whether a spectator interprets this consciously or unconsciously, the 
recognition of fear can prompt prosocial behavior and said prosociality tunes to the political 
message present (given a spectator analyzes and agrees, of course). This is a dialectic, providing a 
synthesis (prosocial action) that is not simply theoretical, but behavioral and political for the 
audience. In Brecht’s theatrical medium, we have a model to achieve this. 
To conclude, I point to the opening scene of Fear and Misery as one of the most ironic 
portrayals of fascist fear. Scene one, “One Big Family,” follows two inebriated SS officers walking 
down the street on the night of January 30th, 1933, the date Adolf Hitler was named Chancellor of 
Germany. The playlet sustains multiple gestic implications, however, an exploration of an 
emotional journey may establish my preceding arguments more soundly within performance. 
While the SS officers move down the street, they discuss the building of Hitler’s nation and how 
they both cannot wait until they have “coaxed out German Man from among all those filthy 
subhumans.”130 The SS officer’s words are undoubtedly vulgar, but what if this was coupled with 
a flash of contempt?131 If we could not hear his words this affectual facial expression provides one 
possible context: the present figure deeply hates something or someone. With the words 
reimplemented we gain the perspective of who or what they despise, but this does not diminish the 
impact and stance of verbal and non-verbal emotional communication and its residence in the 
external social relations. As the SS officers continue to chat, they express a disliking for the 
proletarian part of town they have found themselves in:  
THE FIRST.  Hey, what part of Berlin is this? Not a flag showing. 
 
THE SECOND.  We’ve come the wrong way. 
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THE FIRST.  A horrible sight. 
THE SECOND.  Lots of crooks round here.132  
Here we may see a mixing with contempt or transition to disgust as the SS officers consider the 
external social conditions and their prejudice for whoever resides there. The emotional Haltungen 
has changed because of the external society resulting in means for portraying the figures affectual 
relationships to their Gestus of spatial and human proximities. The final emotional change, and 
that which undergirds the severe inferences of this play, is that of fear. Despite the SS officer’s 
contempt, disgust, and haughty nature, fear envelopes them when an old man opens his window 
to call for an unknown Emma: “Emma are you there?”133 Confronted with a “deplorable” from 
this horrid part of town, the fear and panic send one SS officer into a frenzy. His Haltungen of 
contempt and disgust have contorted to fear as he calls for help, draws his pistol, and shoots all 
around.134  
The emotions are motivating. I have argued for their forefronting as a primary prosocial 
motivator in Brecht’s theatre. The concoctions of our daily emotional drives communicate verbally 
and non-verbally via the face and body in the external social relations. The SS officer did not 
suddenly spur with contempt and disgust because he felt so inclined or without cause; sociality 
catalyzes these emotions through a gestic relationship to society which has molded his specific 
worldview. A perception charged with contrasting emotions that entails more descriptors of figure 
than words could ever detail. This emotional connection to the spectator causes one to critique 
why it is the figures are affected in this manner as we are left with the ringing of gunshots during 
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final tableau of the playlet: “Behind a window opposite the one where the old man is still standing 
a terrible cry is heard. Someone has been hit.”135  
The current section contends that the expression of emotion, specifically fear, embeds in 
the Gestus and Haltung of figures and their contradictions in the external social relations. These 
representations can motivate, instill another element of the figure for spectator analysis, and, most 
importantly, aid Gestus and Haltung in portraying specific behaviors and the pliability of 
humankind. Attaching affect theories of emotional expressiveness to Brechtian aesthetics realizes 
the prosocial possibilities of the dialectical theatre for political effect on a spectating body. The 
expression of fear as a display of distress primes us to help, to placate, and to contextualize the 
source of terror. When a search for horrors pairs with an explicit stance for political action, this 
source is criticized in Brecht’s theatre as circumstances that must change via our own awareness 
and prosocial behavior, all with a few good laughs at farcical fascism.   
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4.0  A SYNTHESIS 
Emotional Expressiveness & Compassion: A Prosocial Path Forward 
 
 
 
 
In sum, my project argues for blending studies of emotional expressiveness with the 
concepts of Gestus and Haltung to offer an approach for more effective prosocial instigation in 
Brecht’s theatre. As I indicate, Fear and Misery of the Third Reich is an excellent play to achieve 
this as it displays fear frequently and intricately to propel its narrative. By observing the social 
behaviors of figures via their Gestus and Haltungen, a spectator can inspect these representations 
of affectual fear to realize they are determined by the Gestus of fascist dictatorship. As 
contradictions frustrate these figures, expressions of fear and misery pose moments to prime 
prosociality in an audience. When their critique reveals the sociopolitical implication that fascism 
brings fear and misery for all, these spectators may now be inclined to assert a prosocial stance 
against fascism, perhaps in both thought and society. Hence, emotion and affect provide a 
psychophysiological method of transmitting verbal and non-verbal social information for prosocial 
change in the external relations of humans.  
Still, questions remain as to avenues for future research. Is fear the only emotion that can 
incite prosocial behavior in a theatrical medium? How can practitioners guarantee that these 
psychological effects will affect a spectating body to accomplish political and prosocial 
transformation “in the streets,” not just within a theatrical space? What role does empathy play in 
the enaction of prosocial behavior? Presently, I have skirted around empathy as a factor to be 
complicated in Brecht’s dialectical theatre. That the nixing of empathetic processes can transpire 
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has come under considerable debate.136 Brecht’s positions on empathy are as complex as his 
thoughts on the emotions and, as such, require further analysis in relation to my current assertions. 
In short, Brecht’s contention with empathy seeks a disruption to empathetic processes, not 
a purposeful exclusion, which even he recognized as impossible. Within a theatrical space, it would 
be futile to eliminate empathy entirely when there are no perceivable means of occluding its 
occurrence. As Barnett asserts, “Brecht feared that the audience would empathize with the 
characters on stage and experience what they experience without standing back and understanding 
why the characters acted as they did.”137 I find Brecht’s concerns legitimate and contend that recent 
studies in cognitive science and social neuroscience are able to support his questionings of “blind” 
empathy that is not critiqued in self, others, and on the stage. 
Cognitive psychologists Claus Lamm & Jasminka Majdandžić posit discretion when 
analyzing the current research on the science and psychology of empathy, especially in relation to 
studies of neural activation and mirror neurons.138 Their critical comment does not offer support 
for Brecht’s deliberate seperation of empathetic processes but provides a decent overview of the 
present problems in empirical discourse. For instance, Lamm and Majdandžić argue that 
statements regarding mirror neurons as fixed, ingrained, and reflexive sensorimotor couplings 
“lead to equally false assertions if applied to the construct of empathy – for example, that we have 
a biologically hard-wired predisposition to automatically respond empathically to others.”139 As 
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opposed to “hard-wired mirroring,” what appears most central to empathetic response and 
instinctiveness is developmental learning and psychosocial experiences.140 Thus, in regard to 
Brecht’s position, his attempts to disrupt known empathetic processes may be dismissed by our 
acquired knowledge, individualities, and sociocultural ecologies, not mirror neurons and motor 
resonance.   
Lamm and Majdandžić also ask, “Does increasing empathy make us ‘better people’?” 
Contrary to narratives that disseminate both within public perception and academic study, the short 
answer is: no. Despite connections made between altruism and empathy “empathy is sensitive to 
deeply-rooted parochialism and in-group bias.”141 Therefore, empathetic processes weaken easily 
by biases like that of ethnicity, cause us to express higher altruistic behavior for in-group members 
such as kin and race, and maintain a lack of evidence for implications on morality, in that morality 
can be separate from empathy. In this sense, empathy cannot be solely relied on, either as a 
prosocial tool or theatrical mechanism, unless the ideas surrounding its effectiveness change and 
a veritable training of “resistance” towards empathetic biases ensues in societies. I agree with 
Lamm and Majdandžić that what we must seek is not simply an increase in empathetic capacities 
at the neural level and/or amongst social relations. Rather, theatre should incite the “impartiality 
of prosocial attitudes and actions in our society” that can be “tailored to include individuals that 
fall outside of our preferred social groups.”142  
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Nonetheless, Brecht’s attempts to promote the building of complicated figures may still 
cause one to empathize with unanticipated abandon or in ways that contrast their own 
positionalities or biases. Brecht grew frustrated with the automaticity of suggestive empathy in 
audiences that caused identification with the grotesque figures he thrust forth for spectator 
engagement. Though, at either the conscious and unconscious levels of experience, what does 
empathy towards the Mack the Knife’s, the Arturo Ui’s, and, perhaps even, the SS/SA men say 
about spectator positionality and understanding?  
Recall that in the 1945 New York production of Fear and Misery Maurice Ellis donned 
white face to estrange racial discrimination in America. Albeit, as I noted, prosocial behavior 
resulting from the proper recognition of fear may have its own cultural biases thus diminishing the 
white face effect. However, this contradiction provides confrontation. To combat cognitive aspects 
as challenging and ingrained as biopsychosocial and evolutionary empathetic implicit biases, the 
first step must be an attempt at complicating confrontation. By providing a hopeful theatrical venue 
for critical commentary on the external social relations, Brecht’s theatre understands 
environmental cause and effect as instigator of prosocial change. Drawing from studies of 
emotional expressiveness, I contend this path towards empathetic impartiality and cognitive 
inclusivity is catalyzing compassion within Brecht’s aesthetics.  
As compassion is a complex socio-affective state, it is “said to have evolved to deal with 
threats and opportunities related to social interactions and to be involved in regulating social 
behaviour, cooperation, affiliation and maintaining supportive and helpful social relationships.”143 
Also, social neuroscientific research suggests that compassion fortifies a “resistance” against the 
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caveats of empathy, such as empathetic burnout and implicit biases.144 Much akin to the 
contradicting expressions of terror on the chalk-faced soliders and the evidence for the recognition 
of fear predicting prosocial behavior, compassion is thus a useful, yet intricate, emotional state and 
affectual expression in human sociality. However, research regarding the specific facial 
constructions of these complex social emotions is embryonic and cannot yet be investigated on 
stage in the same manner as fear.  
Evidently, more examinations must be conducted in both the fields of psychology and 
theatre studies to understand the exact potentialities of prosocially activating audiences who 
participate in Brecht’s theatre. To incite a dialectical communication of the emotions, such as 
observing fear in the playlets of Fear and Misery, enacting prosocial change is only as effective 
as the spectators allow it to be. The contradictions residing in the Gestus and Haltung of fascist 
dictatorship require scrutiny from a spectator. By evincing affectual expressions of fear, spectators 
may be inclined to be fearful of, saddened by, and/or laugh at the consequences that fascism has 
on external social relations. This accomplishes a particular political effect: fascism erodes 
societies. Let us strive to theatrically and socially foment prosocial behavior not only to foster a 
resilience against fascist ideology, but to assertively protest for its eradication with a resonating: 
“NO!” 
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